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Abstract 
In this article, the structure of Hollywood film distribution will be analyzed through the 
lens of risk. In both its technical and conceptual senses, risk is relevant to the study of 
Hollywood’s dominant firms. In the interest of lowering risk, the business interests of 
Hollywood look to predetermine how new films will function in an already instituted 
order of cinema, which includes the creativity of filmmakers and the habits of 
moviegoers. This presentation of risk will explain why, for the political economy of 
Hollywood, the social world of cinema is an instrumental order. While risk is 
specifically about the size and pattern of future earnings, it is also an indirect prediction 
about the stability of the social conditions that would help translate potential earnings 
into an actual stream. The social world of cinema has a bearing on the Hollywood film 
business’s degree of confidence, which refers to the ability of capitalists to make 
predictions about future earnings. 
 
Political-economic analyses of Hollywood often focus on the high concentration of ownership or 
oligopolistic practices in major film distribution (Litman, 1998; Wasko, 2003; Miller et al., 2005; 
Kunz, 2007; Epstein, 2010). These analyses also, by virtue of the type of business sector being 
analyzed, deal with questions related to the aesthetic dimension of Hollywood cinema (Langford, 
2010). The business and art of Hollywood are entangled because contemporary filmmaking is 
organized in such a way that six major firms essentially constitute mainstream film distribution. 
This enables them and the other business interests involved, like banks that offer financing or firms 
that are looking for licensing and merchandising opportunities, to effectively stand between film 
production and the market (Wasko, 1982). As a consequence of this dominance, some film projects, 
on account of their subject matter or style, can be effectively withheld from the market because no 
major firm will purchase the distribution rights. Other film projects can find financing, but under 
contracts that stipulate conditions about form, content, budget, cast, crew, etc. Some films are 
actually produced, but management will often have an active role in the direction and pace of 
creation. And if business interests are still sceptical about their investment in potentially chaotic  
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artistic creativity, the right of film ownership typically includes the right of “final cut,” i.e., the right 
to modify a film before it is released but after the director presents his or her final version (Bach, 
1985). 
In her influential anthropological study Hollywood the Dream Factory, Hortense Powdermaker 
(1950) raised important questions about the so-called ‘necessity’ of putting a harness on creative 
talent in the American film industry. Decades later and in spite of changes to the institutional 
relationship between film production, distribution and exhibition, Powdermaker’s questions still 
ring in our ears: Must the dominant firms of Hollywood purposefully stand between the 
professional filmmaker and the moviegoer? To what degree should the interests of profit dictate the 
terms of social creativity in filmmaking? Is the repetition of Hollywood’s cinematic style 
purposeful? Are long strings of mediocre films a structural problem, or would Hollywood readily 
abolish this type of output if it could employ better artistic talent? 
This article, like Powdermaker’s research, is curious about the relationship between the art of 
Hollywood cinema and the interests of Hollywood’s dominant firms. I propose a methodology that 
emphasizes the role of risk in the performance and behaviour of Hollywood’s dominant firms. Risk 
will be conceptualized as the degree of confidence capitalists have about the future earnings of 
Hollywood cinema. In the interest of lowering risk and increasing its degree of confidence, the 
business interests of Hollywood look to predetermine how new films will function in an already 
instituted order of cinema, which includes the creativity of filmmakers and the habits of 
moviegoers. Thus, if a major studio is trying to determine, with some degree of certainty, the 
potential theatrical attendance for a new romantic comedy, there is a benefit if the larger social 
relations of cinema - involving the creation and consumption of films—are determinable because 
they are ordered. And if the social relations of cinema are determinable because they are ordered, 
Hollywood’s biggest distributors can select film projects and shape the potentials of future 
filmmaking with a greater degree of confidence. 
The first part of this article backgrounds the political-economic theory that helps us to 
understand Hollywood’s analysis of risk. Such an approach allows us to frame risk in the 
Hollywood film business as a manifestation of capitalist power [1]. The concept of strategic 
sabotage, which was first developed by Thorstein Veblen, and that of capitalization show how 
control over the artistic dimension of filmmaking (what films are being made?) and the social habits 
of consumption (what films are being watched?) guide the risk perceptions of major filmed 
entertainment. The latter term refers to the six largest business interests in Hollywood (Columbia, 
Disney, Paramount, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal, and Warner Bros.).  
The second part argues that the creation of an alternative, critical perspective on risk in the 
Hollywood film business is warranted. A short literature review of some of the existing theories on 
risk in Hollywood will demonstrate that risk to business enterprise is commonly thought to be 
beyond the reaches of institutional power, including the power of giant corporations. I agree with 
Janet Wasko (Wasko, 2003; Wasko, 2004) that it is prudent be skeptical of such theories because 
they problematically assume that the major studios of Hollywood are constantly affected by high or 
extremely high risk. In fact, common explanations of why Hollywood is supposedly a high risk 
business enterprise - e.g. ‘nobody’ knows which film projects will be financially successful, or 
major studios are powerless to predefine the relationship between artist and consumer, presume that 
risk is eternally beholden to the ‘external’ forces of consumer sovereignty. 
The third part of this article examines risk as it is defined in the capital-as-power approach. 
According to Nitzan and Bichler, the degree of confidence that capitalists have in their own 
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predictions about expected earnings is an inter-subjective component of the logic of capitalization. 
Additionally, the presence of risk perceptions will explain why the social world of cinema becomes 
an instrumental order to major filmed entertainment and its absentee owners. While risk is 
specifically about the size and pattern of future earnings, it is also an indirect prediction about the 
stability of the social conditions that would help translate potential earnings into an actual stream. 
Thus, major filmed entertainment must ascertain its own strategic impact upon the social creativity 
of cinema. In the context of yet-to-be-released film productions and the wider social world of 
cinema, major filmed entertainment must link its risk perceptions with attempts to control the pace 
and direction of the film industry. Hollywood certainly cannot suffocate the social creativity it 
needs to make a profit, but neither can it allow the aesthetic dimension of cinema to operate without 
institutional harnesses.  
This third part of the article offers more substantial evidence of how risk perceptions can 
determine the strategy of film distribution. The first example relates to a recent dispute over the 
theatrical revenues of Iron Man 3, where Disney fought to increase the share of gross revenues 
given to the major film distributor. The timing of Disney’s strategy to push for a greater share is 
consistent with the historical development of risk in Hollywood film distribution. The second 
example concerns the theatrical release window in the United States, which has changed from 1997 
to 2013. This development challenges assumptions about the indelibility of consumer sovereignty, 
and supports the argument that institutional power can shape the historical circumstances within 
which risk perceptions are made. 
The fourth part will add another layer to our concept of risk. I will argue that the repetitive, 
habitual qualities of Hollywood cinema are a defense against the possibility of aesthetic 
overproduction. Importantly, the term ‘overproduction’ is being used in the same way that Veblen 
used it. Aesthetic overproduction is the language of business, not art; it occurs when aesthetic 
decisions affect the price of a film, regardless of how it might be valued in other respects.  
Capitalist power: Strategic sabotage and capitalization 
The decision to study Hollywood film distribution through the concept of risk derives from my 
general interest in the capital-as-power approach, which is a larger theory about capitalism and the 
character of capital accumulation. First developed by Nitzan and Bichler, this  approach 
understands capitalism to be a mode of power, and not a mode of production or consumption 
(Nitzan and Bichler, 2009). This understanding challenges longstanding assumptions about the 
nature of so-called ‘economic’ value and the measurement of capital. According to Nitzan and 
Bichler, the theoretical isolation of an economic sphere and the privileging of material productivity, 
utility or labour-time, produces logical and empirical problems in both neo-classical and Marxist 
approaches. Essentially, when it is time to explain what gets accumulated, the assumption that 
capital is an objective quantity of material production or consumption leaves the political economist 
with the impossible task of separating ‘real’ value from nominal prices: 
Utils [in neo-classical economics] and abstract labour [in Marxist political economy] 
do not have fundamental quantities that can be measured. They therefore have to be 
derived in reverse, [from nominal prices,] the very phenomena they try to explain. 
And even this inverted derivation falls apart, because it is built on assumptions that 
are patently false if not logically contradictory (Nitzan and Bichler, 2009: 144). 
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Nitzan and Bichler, in contrast, circumvent the ‘real’-nominal distinction because they reject the 
assumptions that produce this methodological tension in the first place. These are that politics and 
economics are separate, and that social power can only ever assist or disturb capital accumulation, 
which is, theoretically, a distinct process. Nitzan and Bichler instead put power at the heart of 
capital. Material production still matters, but a specific labour process or production function does 
not imbue an object with value. Rather, the quantities of capital are symbolic reflections of 
organized power over productivity and social creativity. 
This section will only cover some of the fundamental ideas of the capital-as-power approach - 
just enough to provide a theoretical backdrop for our analysis of risk and the activity of major 
filmed entertainment. According to Nizan and Bichler, this theoretical backdrop is important for 
three reasons. First, risk is an elementary component of the capitalist mode of power. Second, 
assumptions about economics being ‘power-free’ lead other analyses of risk to conclude that, 
ultimately, major filmed entertainment is passive or ineffective against a level of risk that is 
‘inherent’ to the production, distribution and exhibition of films (Litman, 1983; De Vany, 2004; 
Nelson and Glotfelty, 2012; Pokorny, 2005). A power theory of risk, on the other hand, is free to 
investigate the historical development of risk in the Hollywood film business, such as the efforts of 
major filmed entertainment to sustain or even strengthen its dominant position in the world of 
cinema (McMahon, 2013). Third, the capital-as-power approach resonates with - if only partially - 
other theories of Hollywood that already understand major filmed entertainment to possess 
‘distributional power’. Indeed, this article engages with other political-economic theories of culture 
and Hollywood cinema that address the role and effect of institutional power (Hozic, 2001; Leaver, 
2010; Kunz, 2007; Babe, 2009).  
In order to redefine capital as power (not capital and power), Nitzan and Bichler renovate a set 
of concepts that ordinarily explain the mechanisms of capitalist society – i.e. commodification, 
production, distribution, finance and accumulation. A major springboard for Nitzan and Bichler’s 
theory of capitalist power is Thorstein Veblen’s definition of capital, which is built upon a 
conceptual distinction between business and industry. For Veblen, capital belongs to the realm of 
business and not industry. The ways and means of industrial production may or may not be 
beneficial, pleasurable or useful; but what is or is not beneficial, pleasurable or useful about 
material production depends on what cultural and political ideas hold court at a certain moment in 
time (Veblen, 2006a). 
The nominal price of an asset has little to do with the material magnitude of productivity, 
because industry is not the ‘real’ essence of capital. A stock of technology, knowledge, or energy 
says nothing about how material and intellectual benefits are distributed amongst members of a 
community. Capital, for Veblen, “is a pecuniary concept, not a technological one; a concept of 
business, not of industry” (Veblen, 2006a: 359). Veblen is not denying the influences of 
technological efficiency and the sweat of labour on the success of business—indeed, production is a 
necessary condition. But capitalization is not measuring the utility of technology or the efficiency of 
the production process; it is measuring the ability to make a profit. 
As Nitzan and Bichler note, Veblen’s distinction between business and industry reveals how 
prices and earnings do not reflect “productivity per se,” but “the control of productivity for 
capitalist ends” (Nitzan and Bichler, 2009: 223). In capitalism, control and power stand outside 
industry (Nitzan and Bichler, 2000: 78). Business is the power of private ownership over industry. 
The owner derives an income from his or her legal rights to sabotage industry, to “keep the work 
out of the hands of the workmen and the product out of the market” (Veblen, 2004: 66). Just as 
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importantly, these rights of private ownership need not be exercised for sabotage to be effective: 
“What matters is the right to exclude and the ability to exact terms for not exercising that right” 
(Nitzan and Bichler, 2009: 228). In fact, the sabotage of industry is always strategic—too little 
sabotage can be just as disastrous for earnings as too much sabotage. The best strategy for business 
is to “charge what the traffic will bear.” This, according to Veblen,  
consists, on the one hand, in stopping down production to such a volume as will bring 
the largest net returns in terms of price, and in allowing so much of a livelihood to the 
working force of technicians and workmen, on the other hand, as will induce them to 
turn out this limited output (Veblen, 2004: 67). 
Thus, in order to exist, a film business must be able to threaten to withhold the products of the 
industrial processes it controls. Free limitless production is not sound business strategy:  
The only way ... spending [on productive capacity] can become profit-yielding 
investment is if others are prohibited from freely utilizing its outcome. In this sense, 
capitalist investment—regardless of how 'productive' it may appear or how much 
growth it seems to 'generate'--remains what it always was: an act of limitation (Nitzan 
and Bichler, 2009: 233).  
Moreover, the Hollywood film business must also decide how it will strategically sabotage the 
social creativity of filmmaking. The creative well of filmmaking is this ‘wide’ because, as an 
industrial art, it draws from many technological and intellectual developments in society. Each 
modern film, for instance, relies on the historical development of human knowledge about light, 
sound, storytelling, verbal and nonverbal communication and so on. Each film draws from the 
development of ideas about style, setting and mood. Each new film can draw freely from the many 
sharable aspects of cinematic art: its methods, techniques, philosophies and even many of the ideas 
involved in making a film. For filmmaking as a business concern, however, many of these 
productive elements in art have zero earning potential because their use and application cannot be 
protected through copyrights or any other means of exclusion. For example, there is no copyright 
for the genre of horror or the idea that a good story involves a protagonist and an antagonist. Thus, 
capitalist investment in cinema looks out into the world of culture, but it does so with a specific 
purpose.  
As an example, take the first Star Wars film (George Lucas, 1977). On the one hand, Lucas was 
able to create parts of Star Wars by freely appropriating myths and ideas that are in the public 
domain (Decherney, 2012). On the other hand, there are all of the copyrighted elements of Star 
Wars, which Lucas successfully registered under the ‘Star Wars Corporation’ [2]. First, we have the 
motion picture itself, which was initially owned by three parties: the Star Wars Corporation, 
Twentieth Century-Fox Licensing Corporation and General Mills Fun Group, Inc. We then have the 
elements that Lucas publicly registered as his property. Luke Skywalker, for instance, can be treated 
as an asset (now under Disney) because it is copyrighted as ‘Visual Material’. This is the 
institutional mechanism of exclusion that allows owners to command a price from all of the Luke 
Skywalker imagery that does not fall under ‘fair use’. There are also many other copyrighted 
elements, from the obvious (e.g., Han Solo, Darth Vader, Ben Kenobi) to the seemingly trivial (e.g. 
‘X-Starfighter attacking Death Star’, ‘Front view of Corellian starship’, ‘Imperial storm troopers 
confronting Han Solo, Luke Starfiller and Chewbacca the Wookiee’, ‘Princess Leia Organa awards 
the heros [sic] of the rebellion’) [3]. 
McMahon  33 
When capitalist in form, this power over the pace and direction of industry is connected to the 
common terms and symbols of modern finance, the formal language of business enterprise. The 
foundation of modern finance, according to Nitzan and Bichler, is the logic of capitalization. This 
logic is quantitative in form and forward-looking in orientation. Capitalization is the discounting of 
expected future earnings to present prices [4]. 
What is capitalized is the “income-stream” that is attached to an object through ownership:  
The capital value of a business concern at any given time, its purchase value as a going 
concern, is measured by the capitalized value of its presumptive earnings; which is a question 
of its presumptive earning-capacity and of the rate or co-efficient of capitalization currently 
accepted at the time; and the second of these two factors is intimately related to the rate of 
discount ruling at the time (Veblen, 2004: 219).  
While the ultimate concern of the capitalist is to make an actual profit, “presumptive earnings” are 
only ever expectations about future streams of income. Thus, capitalists attempt to be forward-
looking; they try to account for all of the social conditions that could potentially affect how 
potential earnings become real. In the case of the Hollywood film business, expectations about 
future earnings account for, among other things, the established culture of cinema. Only with 
reference to the larger world of cinema could a capitalist determine whether a film property has any 
value - not as art, but as an asset.   
This section has provided concepts that can be applied, in more detail, to the strategies of major 
filmed entertainment. The logic of capitalization and its institutional foundation, the ability for 
business interests to sabotage industry, will frame our analysis of risk perceptions and the social 
relations of cinema. 
Towards an alternative, critical concept of risk 
Risk does have a place in mainstream economic studies of Hollywood, but many of these 
investigations tend to run into one very significant problem. Essentially, neo-classical approaches 
ignore the historical development of risk. An ahistorical concept of risk sets systemic risk at an 
‘inherent’ level, which, in the case of the Hollywood film business, is deemed to be somewhere 
between high and very high. Consequently, the particular techniques of major filmed entertainment, 
such as the repetition of genres, sequels and remakes, the cult of movie stars, and the bombardment 
of media advertising and promotion, cannot affect the level of risk nor change the social 
environment about which risk perceptions are made. 
Janet Wasko has been an important critic of this idea of inherent risk in Hollywood. 
Moviemaking “has been described,” writes Wasko, “as an ‘inherently risky business”. Yet, when 
Hollywood is considered from a political-economic perspective, any number of issues arise which 
makes the risky nature of the business much less obvious (Wasko, 2004: 135). Included in the list of 
important issues that should make us reconsider the role of risk - “availability of data, distribution 
arrangements, definitions of profit, sources of revenue” - Wasko asks us to ponder why, despite 
“the presumed risk involved, the major distribution companies manage to survive and (usually 
profit)” (Wasko, 2004: 143). The purpose of this article is to theorize how risk is a function of those 
who seek to own, control and, possibly, profit from the world of cinema. More specifically, this 
section elaborates upon the decision to seek an alternative, critical concept of risk for understanding 
capitalist power, major filmed entertainment and the political economy of Hollywood. 
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The ahistorical concept of risk is produced when neo-classical approaches move from the 
particular to the universal, and when general conclusions about risk in the Hollywood film business 
are drawn from studies of specific risk-reduction strategies (De Vany, 2004; Litman, 1983; Nelson 
and Glotfelty, 2012; Pokorny, 2005). At the level of specific strategies, neo-classical arguments 
acknowledge that the Hollywood film business can actively reduce risk. Some theorists consider 
how famous movie stars, with their perceived ability to draw consumers to some movies rather than 
others, are employed to reduce financial risk (Elberse, 2007; Hadida, 2010; Ravid, 1999). Others 
point to the blockbuster method of filmmaking, which is argued to be Hollywood’s style of choice 
because it is also a risk-reduction technique (Litman, 1998; Ravid, 1999; Denisoff and Plasketes, 
1990). At a macro level of analysis, however, corporate activity in the Hollywood film business is 
rendered passive, and discussion of the contemporary star system and blockbuster cinema say little 
about the historical development of risk.  
What explains this? The possibility that risk perceptions will significantly change over time is 
out of place in studies that assume that so-called economic actors are, under perfect competition, 
too insignificant to change the historical circumstances of risk. In other words, risk-reduction 
strategies, no matter how effective at a micro level, never transform the business environment itself 
(De Vany, 2004). In part because its oligopolistic character is downplayed or even ignored, the 
Hollywood film business, as a whole, is seen to have an ‘inherent’ level of risk that is impervious to 
historical transformation.  
In this ‘power-free’ version of Hollywood cinema, risk-reducing techniques are essentially 
conservative reactions to consumer sovereignty, which is theorized as an extraneous force. Business 
techniques can be effective, they can even somehow lower risks for subsequent projects, but, in this 
theoretical narrative, capitalists cannot create a cultural environment that favors their pecuniary 
interests. The world of cinema can never be made to have machine-like regularity if it is assumed 
the sovereign consumer is an unalterable variable (such that the consumer always has the same 
‘economic’ freedom to be fickle when the next film is released) (Garvin, 1981: 4). 
The notion that risk has an ‘inherent’ level because firms only ever contend with the vagaries of 
consumer sovereignty adds an unnecessary theoretical obstacle to an analysis of capitalist power. 
Consumer sovereignty and the ideas that spring from it are, as noted by Leo Lowenthal, born from 
the “false hypothesis that the consumer's choice is the decisive social phenomenon from which we 
should begin further analysis” (Lowenthal, 1961: 12). Thus, an uncritical concept of consumer 
sovereignty skews our view of the capitalist order because it is unwilling to accept that individual 
autonomy and individualistic choice are not the same thing. Opposing this ideological view, 
Marcuse explains how choice can exist without autonomy:  
Under the rule of the repressive whole, liberty can be made into a powerful instrument 
of domination. The range of choice open to the individual is not the decisive factor in 
determining the degree of human freedom, but what can be chosen and what is chosen 
by the individual. The criterion for free choice can never be an absolute one, but 
neither is it entirely relative. Free election of masters does not abolish the masters or 
the slaves. Free choice among a wide variety of goods and services does not signify 
freedom if these goods and services sustain social control over a life of toil and fear—
that is, if they sustain alienation. And the spontaneous reproduction of superimposed 
needs by the individual does not establish autonomy; it only testifies to the efficacy of 
the controls (Marcuse, 1991: 7–8). 
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Thus, while there is no direct, physical coercion to buy and consume commodities for pleasure and 
relaxation, the realm of leisure time - this apparent sanctuary of the private individual - is not 
necessarily a realm without power. 
Consequently, a neo-classical theory of consumer sovereignty stumbles because its definition of 
economic behavior is oblivious to an historical reality characterized from around 1900 onwards, by 
trusts, trade associations, giant corporations, conglomerates, active governments and other social 
institutions that can shape consumer behavior. The idea of consumer sovereignty rationalizes 
consumer behavior as a series of “revealed preferences,” even though, as Galbraith notes, the hyper-
activity of capitalist firms in marketing, advertising, and branding makes it difficult to find the 
sovereign consumer among society’s creators of wants: “So it is that if production creates the wants 
it seeks to satisfy, or if the wants emerge pari passu with the production, then the urgency of wants 
can no longer be used to defend the urgency of the production. Production only fills a void that it 
has itself created” (Galbraith, 1997: 125).  
With respect to the Hollywood film business, a neo-classical approach is unable to acknowledge 
how massive fixtures like blockbuster cinema and the star system reduce risk because these fixtures 
are actively producing and habituating consumer taste. Thus, what appears to be acknowledged on 
one hand is taken away with the other: a consumer will “form attachments to specific film ‘markers’ 
such as stars and genre,” they will even “seek a degree of familiarity in their film consumption 
experience”—but, nevertheless, “consumer tastes in film are ultimately unpredictable” [5]. For 
some, the permanence of consumer sovereignty reveals an ‘inherent’ level of risk so high that ex 
ante predictions are actually impossible. Arthur De Vany, for instance, uses complex statistical 
modeling to substantiate screenwriter William Goldman’s statement that, with respect to making 
predictions about the future of Hollywood cinema, “nobody knows anything.” According to De 
Vany,  
revenue forecasts have zero precision, which is just a way of saying that ‘anything can 
happen’…. The ‘nobody knows’ principle…is revealed in the infinite variance and 
scale-free form of the probability distribution. When the probability distribution is 
scale free it has no characteristic size and there is no typical movie. If variance is 
infinite, the prediction is impossible; one can only say that the expected revenue of a 
movie is X plus or minus infinity (De Vany, 2004: 260). 
De Vany’s conclusion that “the confidence interval of [a] forecast is without bounds”(2004: 71) is 
unsatisfying because it assumes a framework whereby the Hollywood film business is eternally 
beholden to this extremely high degree of uncertainty. To be sure, it could certainly be possible that 
Hollywood has had periods of great uncertainty; however, an ahistorical analysis of risk cannot help 
but reify its conclusions. 
On this point, it is helpful to briefly discuss the concept of history that underlies the capital-as-
power approach. For Nitzan and Bichler, societies are historical because human beings have the 
ability to change the foundations of a social order through active creation. Nitzan and Bichler 
capture this point with the verb-noun creorder: “Historical society is a creorder. At every passing 
moment, it is both Parmenidean and Heraclitean: a state in process, a construct reconstructed, a 
form transformed. To have history is to create order…” (Nitzan and Bichler, 2009: 305). The 
capital-as-power approach is, therefore, useful for investigating the historical development of risk. 
Capitalist power may never be able to make the business of culture risk-free, but we put up barriers 
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to our own analysis if we assume, ahistorically, that risk in Hollywood is simply inherent. Indeed, 
the very idea of ‘inherent risk’ is specious because consumer sovereignty in capitalism is a myth.  
Risk and the order of cinema 
Major filmed entertainment, as a capitalist institution, is forward-looking. Its financial expectations 
concern the future of Hollywood cinema and mass culture in general. But if this is the case, how 
can we understand the role of risk in the capitalization of cinema?  
Capitalization, Nitzan and Bichler clarify, does not require a crystal ball that can see into the 
future. Rather, capitalization is a ritual that attempts to estimate how a stream of income and its 
necessary social conditions will carry into the future. The difference between prophecy and 
estimation is significant. Capitalist society, with its myriad of qualities, can only carry into the 
future through the activities and beliefs of people. It is also possible for social behavior to change, 
sometimes in ways that capitalists could never expect. But whether the composition of capitalist 
society appears to be frozen or in flux, the future expectations of business enterprise can never 
determine an Archimedean point that is outside of society or safe from the winds of history. 
Consequently, risk perceptions are an elementary component of capitalization. 
Risk is a partly subjective factor that shapes the way a claim on future earnings is assessed. If 
capitalization discounts the size and pattern of a future stream of earnings, risk is the expression of 
the “degree of confidence capitalists have in their own predictions” (Nitzan and Bichler, 2009: 208). 
Nitzan and Bichler argue that this degree of confidence appears in the capitalization equation as a 
risk coefficient (δ), which we can write in simplified form (for the moment we are ignoring hype 
(H), which is in the numerator): 




Capitalization at any given time (Kt) is equal to the discounted value of expected future earnings 
(EE). Expected future earnings are discounted by two variables: a rate of return that capitalists feel 
they can confidently get (rc) and the risk coefficient (δ). A smaller δ indicates a greater degree of 
confidence and a larger capitalization, and vice versa when δ is larger. If, for instance, there is 
growing uncertainty about the size and pattern of a future stream of earnings, δ will increase and the 
asset in question will be discounted to a lower present price [6]. 
Risk is also an important variable in Nitzan and Bichler’s conceptualization of power. Put 
briefly, Nitzan and Bichler understand power as “confidence in obedience: it represents the 
certainty of the rulers in the submissiveness of the ruled” (Nitzan and Bichler, 2009: 398). Thus, if 
we were to translate δ into the language of power, risk is about the probability that future social 
behavior will be heteronomous.  Heteronomy speaks to the duration and strength of obedience. For 
instance, heteronomy can exist when individuals internalize the goals of a repressive society, such 
that the persistence of fear, violence and poverty actually helps social power acquire an “unshiftable 
weight” (Castoriadis, 1998: 109). Yet, however strong, a state of heteronomy is always threatened 
by the possibility that individual autonomy will resurface in the future. Even the largest empires or 
the most repressive political regimes teach us that the present is never an absolute guarantee that 
obedience will carry on indefinitely. Therefore, risk is the product of society’s inability to fully 
extirpate the potential for individual autonomy to resurface in the future [7]. 
With respect to the Hollywood film business, risk perceptions account for the possibility that the 
future of culture will be radically different from what capitalists expect it to be. This logic of 
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capitalist accounting, while quantitative in expression (prices, income, volatility, etc.), is social in 
essence. In fact, the risk perceptions of major filmed entertainment cannot overlook any social 
dimension of cinema, be it aesthetic, political or cultural. The eye of capitalization searches for any 
social condition that could have an impact on “the level and pattern of capitalist earnings” (Nitzan 
and Bichler, 2009: 166).  
As Bill Grantham notes, this thorough evaluation of risk is evident at the level of project 
financing: “film risk is variable and the degree of risk is subject to structural considerations as well 
as the greater or lesser degree of ‘riskiness’ inherent in any project's subject matter, or associated 
with its writer, director, stars, and so on” (Grantham, 2012: 200). Based on what was said above, 
Grantham’s use of the term ‘inherent’ can now be seen as misleading. ‘Riskiness’, as it is being 
used here, is a term of business, not art. We may be tempted to label a film ‘risky’ if it challenges 
social taboos, or if it, like Věra Chytilová’s Daisies (1966), uses the cinematic medium to critique 
political regimes. A filmmaker can also be said to be taking an ‘aesthetic risk’, such as when he or 
she develops an untested cinematic style. However, indeterminate creativity in the realm of 
aesthetics or the development of political cinema can both exist separately from the logic of capital. 
In fact, it is Veblen’s point that pecuniary value is not simply reflecting political, cultural or 
aesthetic quality. Rather, the vested interests of Hollywood flip the definition of value. Under the 
logic of capital the potentials of creativity, both anthropological and technological, are judged on 
the terms of capitalist investment. We might always have poorly made films, but under capitalism, a 
bad movie is one that falls well below its financial expectations [8]. 
With one eye on film projects themselves and the other on the social world of cinema and 
culture at large, major filmed entertainment uses its oligopolistic control of distribution to create an 
order of cinema. The creation of order does not eliminate risk entirely. Rather, from the perspective 
of major filmed entertainment, the industrial art of filmmaking and the social world of mass culture 
should be orderly enough for each new film project to be weighable and calculable. Estimations 
about a film’s social significance can be, with a degree of confidence, translated into expectations 
about future streams of income.  This degree of confidence is created and sustained through 
institutional power. The various business strategies of major filmed entertainment affect risk 
perceptions just as much as they affect earnings: the repetition of genres, sequels, remakes; the cult 
of movie stars; the institution of false needs and wants through the sales efforts of business; and the 
dual ability to make movies resonate with established desires and to ready the industry of 
filmmaking for potential changes in social desire. These techniques schematize the social relations 
of cinema (Adorno, 2004). Social habits, attitudes and values, in this environment, become things 
that can fit into a ‘knowable’ distribution, which then can be quantified as ‘risk’. 
A film’s relationship to other films and the social habits of consumers, who watch some films at 
the expense of others, also arranges the social world of cinema into an order. In fact, the 
composition of the cinematic world has, under capitalism, a readily available universal language: 
price. When a film is given an expected theatrical revenues plateau (e.g. $20 million, $70 million, 
$300 million), the Hollywood film business is making an estimate about the future popularity of the 
film (Litman, 1998). This financial estimate automatically positions a film among other films. For 
instance, an expectation of $200 million in theatrical revenues means something in relation to how 
other contemporary films are capitalized. Depending on how other films are capitalized, capitalists 
could expect that $200 million in box-office revenues would make this film one of the top grossing 
films in its year of release (McMahon, 2013).  
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On the question of how the social dimensions of film affect the risk perceptions of major filmed 
entertainment, there are plenty of examples. Some are found in the annual reports of the relevant 
firms. Time Warner, the owner of Warner Brothers Studios, lists risk factors relating to filmed 
entertainment and leisure time: 
[Time Warner] must respond to recent and future changes in technology and consumer 
behavior to remain competitive and continue to increase its revenues…. [Time 
Warner] faces risks relating to increasing competition for the leisure and 
entertainment time and discretionary spending of consumers, which has intensified in 
part due to technological developments and changes in consumer behavior…. The 
popularity of [Time Warner’s] content is difficult to predict, can change rapidly and 
could lead to fluctuations in the Company’s revenues, and low public acceptance of 
the Company’s content may adversely affect its results of operations (Time Warner, 
2011: 13).  
This ‘public acceptance’ of the Company’s content is important. If a film property is to be valued as 
an asset, its form and content must be evaluated - even before the film is made - in the light of 
social meaning (Vogel, 2011: 99–106). For example, on account of its style and subject matter, film 
property may lose its relevance (i.e. pecuniary value as property) as social meaning changes with 
the passage of historical time:  
…war epics, for instance, might be very popular with the public during certain periods 
but very unpopular during others. Some humor in films is timeless; some is so terribly 
topical that within a few years audiences may not understand it. In addition, because 
everything from hair and clothing styles to cars to moral attitudes changes gradually 
over time, the cumulative effects of these changes can make movies from only two 
decades ago seem rather quaint (Vogel, 2011: 101). 
On the problem of treating a film as a long-lived asset, Stephen Prince is correct to argue that part 
of the uncertainty relates to the technological changes in distribution (theater, VHS, DVD, etc.). 
“Determining the profitability of a given film,” writes Prince, “can be an elusive undertaking 
because so many revenue sources figure into this determination…”(Prince, 2000: xx). However, 
part of the reason why so few films are released into the public domain, regardless of technological 
changes, is because every significant shift in social-historical relevance gives major filmed 
entertainment another opportunity to re-capitalize its old film property.  
The tragic death of an actor can make their filmography popular again; a new channel of 
distribution, like Turner Classic Movies, can open future income streams for films that have not 
been distributed in decades; or, genres, like science fiction and musicals, can suddenly rebound in 
significance. These examples contextualize the valuation of film libraries [9], which are often key 
assets in the mergers and acquisitions of media conglomerates (Vogel, 2011; Kunz, 2007). Indeed, 
Casablanca (Michael Curtiz, 1942) is still an asset (for Time Warner). Would expectations about its 
future earnings not account for the film’s almost mythological position in popular histories of 
cinema? How would one re-capitalize Casablanca if the American Film Institute, in its next round 
of publishing lists of great American films, knocked this film down in rankings, or removed it from 
‘AFI’s 100 Years…100 Movies’?  
Although it occurs infrequently, changes to the social order of cinema can be so abrupt that great 
uncertainty surrounds the capitalization of film property. One such change was the transition from 
silent film to sound in the late 1920s. For example, the uncertainty of whether silent films would 
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still have a place alongside ‘talkies’ forced Albatross, a medium-sized French company, to 
temporarily stop all film production, as they were unable to price their own property: 
We have not been able to do it [assess the book value of completed films], because the 
sudden shock that shudders through the motion picture markets because of the 
apparition of sound film, makes every estimate, even approximately, impossible, 
especially for the older films. At present, most foreign countries have stopped nearly 
completely to buy them. We must put on hold all film production until the situation 
becomes clear (Conseil d’Administration , April 25, 1929, quoted in Bakker, 2004: 
64). 
Although less severe than its effect on Albatross, the beginnings of a sound cinema even created 
uncertainty for the studios that were actively developing sound technology [10]. Because the 
aesthetics of sound cinema were still too open-ended during this nascent period, the major studios 
agreed to place a temporary moratorium on their own research and development. To really pursue 
sound cinema as a business enterprise, Hollywood studios first needed to decide if they were going 
to export American ‘talkies’ in English, or whether they would be more accommodating to the 
languages of other countries [11]. Just as significantly, they did not yet know what a sound film 
should even look like (Hanssen, 2005). Music and sound effects could be retro-fitted onto films that 
were originally silent; a film could be released in two versions, one silent and another in sound; or, 
a film like The Jazz Singer (Alan Crosland, 1927) could be silent for the majority of its running 
time, except for a few scenes with dialogue or singing.  
Certain journalists have been fortunate enough to witness how this problem of social 
significance manifests on a film set or the studio lot, when studio executives, producers and 
directors argue over the form and content of film projects. In Lillian Ross’ Picture, a book that was 
a product of her reporting on the filming of The Red Badge of Courage (John Huston, 1951), we 
find a recurring theme of creativity and risk. Many of the daily struggles over how the film was to 
be filmed were the consequences of MGM’s management and their uncertainty about whether 
Americans in 1951 were even interested in seeing a film version of an 1895 book about the Civil 
War (Ross, 2002). In 1967, John Gregory Dunne spent one year investigating the workings of 
Twentieth Century-Fox. One of Dunne’s stories is crass yet illustrative of how the qualities of 
cinema can become elements of risk perception. He describes a meeting where Twentieth Century 
executives were talking about the studio’s plan to distribute Tony Rome (Gordon Douglas, 1967) in 
Israel. The film, which is a detective story and stars Frank Sinatra, is heavy on American slang. 
Two people in the meeting, Harry Sokolov and Stanley Hough, were concerned that much of the 
dialogue would not resonate with an Israeli audience. Richard Zanuck, who at the time was 
executive vice president in charge of worldwide production, was not as worried, as it was always 
possible to “dub it in local slang.” As Dunne then notes, Owen McLean, the head of casting, still 
worried about one scene in particular, which he feared may be untranslatable: “there was a scene in 
the picture based on the double-entendre of an old woman calling her cat a ‘pussy’” (Dunne, 1998: 
154). 
Uncertainty about the effectiveness of a double-entendre is not an insignificant concern. In fact, 
a PricewaterhouseCoopers report can give us a sense of how a shift in what is considered funny or 
entertaining can create real financial problems for those that are culpable for the costs of a film. A 
change in the world of cinema can cause a ‘pre-release’ write-down, which happens when the costs 
of the film become larger than its future expected earnings. As the report states, “pre-release write-
McMahon  40 
downs generally occur when there is an adverse change in the expected performance of a ﬁlm prior 
to release” (Anon, 2009: 26). Of the five examples about what can adversely change the future 
expectations of an individual film, four of them relate to the social relations of cinema: 
 
 “Market conditions for the ﬁlm that have changed signiﬁcantly due to timing 
or other economic conditions;” 
 “Screening, marketing, or other similar activities that suggest the performance 
of the ﬁlm will be signiﬁcantly different from previous expectations;” 
 “A signiﬁcant change to the ﬁlm’s release plan and strategy;” and, 
 “Other observable market conditions, such as those associated with recent 
performance of similar ﬁlms” (Anon, 2009: 26).  
 
All of these examples help explain what is included in the risk perceptions of major filmed 
entertainment. So how important is the role of risk in the capitalization of cinema? Figure 1 
suggests that a high degree of confidence about the social world of cinema is of great importance to 
major filmed entertainment. Figure 1 compares two series. The first measures U.S. movie 
attendance per capita. After a sharp decline that was most likely caused by the advent of television, 
U.S. attendance per capita has stayed at roughly the same level since the 1960s. The second series 
presents the yearly total of all films released in America. This total includes many more films than 
the films released by major filmed entertainment. Showing the total helps illustrate how risk 
reduction might be a top priority if, from 1980 onwards, more and more movies are technically 
available, but in practice the average American is still only seeing about five films per year. In this 
context of film consumption, the contemporary goal of major filmed entertainment might be to 
determine which five films the average moviegoer sees: i.e. to create a determinable order of 
cinema that keeps the spotlight directly on its own films. Hollywood may certainly try to expand the 
market, pushing people to see more films in theatres. However, with U.S. attendance per capita 
having remained constant for over fifty years, the alternative strategy is for major filmed 
entertainment to ensure that mostly their own blockbusters are seen by moviegoers (Cucco,2009).  
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Figure 1. U.S. Theatrical Attendance and Theatrical Releases 
Note: For 1943-1959, attendance per capita = (total box-office receipts/average ticket price/U.S. population) 
Sources: Joel Finler, Joel W. Finler, The Hollywood Story, 3rd ed. (New York: Wallflower Press, 2003) 376-377, for box-office 
receipts from 1943-1959; Bradley Schauer and David Bordwell, “Appendix: A Hollywood Timeline, 1960-2004,” in The Way 
Hollywood Tells It: Story and Style in Modern Movies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 191–242 for total attendance 
from 1960-2004; http://natoonline.org/data/admissions/ for attendance 2005-2012. Global Insight for total United States population. 
Joel W Finler, The Hollywood Story, 3rd ed. (New York: Wallflower Press, 2003) 376-377, for total U.S. releases from 1933-2002; 
MPAA Theatrical Market Statistics for total U.S. releases from 2003-2012. Joel W. Finler, The Hollywood Story, 3rd ed. (New York: 
Wallflower Press, 2003) 376-377, for total releases and MPAA releases from 1933-2002; see MPAA Theatrical Market Statistics for 
total releases and MPAA releases from 2003-2012. 
 
A redistributive strategy where people are giving more attention to Hollywood cinema but not 
necessarily seeing more films per year is aided by the development of digital technology and the 
Internet. For example, at Epagogix, a consulting firm of sorts, a database has been created to 
quantify the smallest details of a potential film project. After having broken down a client’s script 
into separate elements, the database produces ‘values’ for each element, as if the film was one big 
neoclassical production function. Malcolm Gladwell witnessed Epagogix’s process in 2006:  
[Copaken, the co-founder of Epagogix,] started with the first film and had the neural 
network make a guess: maybe it said that the hero’s moral crisis in act one, which 
rated a 7 on the 10-point moral-crisis scale, was worth $7 million, and having a 
gorgeous red-headed eighteen-year-old female lead whose characterization came in at 
6.5 was worth $3 million and a 9-point bonding moment between the male lead and a 
four-year-old boy in act three was worth $2 million, and so on… (Gladwell, 2006: 
143). 
The New York Times recently reported on a company similar to Epagogix, one named World Wide 
Motion Picture Group (Barnes, 2013). By running their own database and surveying the tastes of 
moviegoers, World Wide offers advice about the final construction of a Hollywood film. For 
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example, they argue that it is risky for any film to have a bowling scene. Or, if you make a 
superhero movie, it is better for the bottom line that the protagonist is a “guardian superhero” and 
not a “cursed superhero.” 
Google is doing something similar. Focusing on the Internet use of potential moviegoers, they 
argue that risk is a top priority in the capitalization of cinema. For example, a 2013 Google 
Whitepaper begins with a problem scenario: 
It’s Friday night and you’re thinking about seeing a movie. Your thought process 
might sound a little like this: What’s in theaters right now? What’s that new movie my 
friend was just talking about a couple days ago? That trailer I saw for another film a 
few weeks ago looked interesting. Another movie review I read sounded 
promising...what should I see? (Google, 2013: 1). 
The ‘problem’ is that leisure-time is too open-ended. The solution, however, is more for the 
capitalist than the moviegoer that is using the Internet to make a decision on Friday night. To help 
quantify movie magic - i.e. the process by which the moviegoer makes up his/her mind—Google 
tracks searches, YouTube views and advertisement clicks. It keeps data on searches for specific 
titles, especially big names like The Dark Knight (Christopher Nolan, 2008) or The Avengers (Joss 
Whedon, 2012). Google also analyzes how the search criteria of potential moviegoers becomes less 
specific and more generic in slow periods between blockbuster films.  
Google claims that such data lends confidence to Hollywood’s expectations about the future 
performance of theatrical exhibition. The effect is twofold. First, the data provided by Google can 
tell marketing teams how to adjust marketing strategies to “either capture the attention of the 
‘curious’ moviegoer, or deepen audience engagement with a blockbuster title” (Google, 2013: 3). 
Second, and more significantly, Google states that Internet data can help Hollywood predict future 
movie sales. For instance, “in the seven day window prior to a film’s release date, if one film has 
250,000 more search queries than a similar film, the film with more queries is likely to perform up 
to $4.3M better during opening weekend. When looking at search and click volume, if a film has 
20,000 more paid clicks than a similar film, it is expected to bring in up to $7.5M more during 
opening weekend” (Google, 2013, p.5). 
This article has taken some initial steps to develop a political economic theory of risk in the 
Hollywood film business. So far, we have introduced the capital-as-power approach to the study of 
Hollywood cinema, critiqued mainstream approaches to risk, re-conceptualized risk as a degree of 
confidence and theorized how risk perceptions are related to the social relations of cinema. Ideally, 
this approach to the political economy of Hollywood will transform into a more substantial critical 
and empirical methodology. Thus, let us offer two examples of how this political economic theory 
might be applied to future empirical and historical research on Hollywood.  
Intra-capitalist struggle: major filmed entertainment versus theater 
owners 
 First, let us contextualize recent news of an intra-capitalist dispute over the distribution and 
theatrical exhibition of a Hollywood blockbuster. In 2013 the Los Angeles Times reported a dispute 
between Disney and two major theatre owners, AMC Entertainment and Regal Entertainment. The 
dispute was over the release of Iron Man 3 (Shane Black, 2013) and how its theatrical revenues 
were going to be split between Disney and theater owners. According to the Los Angeles Times, 
studios “typically collect 50% to 55% of ticket sales, depending on the movie.” AMC and Regal 
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were challenging Disney because, for Iron Man 3, “Disney was seeking an excessively large take of 
the box-office revenue—up to 65%”(Verrier, 2013). 
How might we understand this dispute? Having recently acquired Marvel Studios and 
Lucasfilm, Disney is in a position to benefit from the future of blockbuster cinema, should its 
popularity continue. Disney’s boldness about the distribution of Iron Man 3 might also portend 
something more general: its degree of confidence about the future earnings of the Marvel superhero 
universe and its other franchises. Because the order of cinema is currently structured to give the top 
tier of films the majority of theatrical revenues (Weinstein, 2005; McMahon, 2013), the threat to 
withhold anticipated blockbusters from the community at large is a big one.  
The underlying power structure of this dispute can also be seen if we take a historical view of 
the struggle between distribution and exhibition in contemporary Hollywood. Figure 2 compares 
two time series. The thick line measures the number of major filmed entertainment releases from 
1975 to 2012. It is expressed as a percentage of the total number of films released in the United 
States per year. The dotted series measures, from 1975 to 2007, major filmed entertainment’s share 
of all U.S. box-office revenues per year. This series is an indirect measure of the struggle between 
major filmed entertainment and theater owners - i.e. there is a certain amount of theatrical revenues 
each year and it is by means of contract negotiation that a certain share goes to the film distributors 
of Hollywood (Vogel, 2011). 
The last year data is available for major filmed entertainment’s box-office share is 2007. We can 
create a hypothetical extension of the series with the details of the Iron Man 3 contract dispute for 
2013. On the dotted series one can extrapolate an 18% increase over the historical average of major 
filmed entertainment’s share of box-office revenues between 1975 and 2007.   
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Figure 2. Major Filmed Entertainment’s Film Releases and Theatrical Revenues 
Note: Both series are 3-year moving averages. 
  
Sources: Joel W Finler, The Hollywood Story, 3rd ed (New York: Wallflower Press, 2003) 376-377, for total releases and MPAA 
releases from 1975-2002; MPAA Theatrical Market Statistics for total releases and MPAA releases from 2003-2012. Vogel, 
Entertainment Industry Economics, 88-89, for MPAA U.S. rentals % of box-office from 1975-2007. 
 
The period from 2007 to 2013 is illuminating. Since major filmed entertainment’s share of 
theatrical revenues is increasing as its share of all film releases is decreasing, the rules of the game 
might be changing. In Figure 2, for most of the period from 1977 to 2006, there is a positive 
correlation (+0.72) between major filmed entertainment’s share of total releases and its share of all 
theatrical revenues. This corroborates the research of Robert W. Crandall, who looked at the 
structure of Hollywood film distribution from 1948 to 1967. Crandall recognized that the means of 
strategic sabotage “at the distributors’ disposal” were still there and that they “were quite 
straightforward—the control over the number of film releases per year” (Crandall, 1975: 62). By 
“controlling the only non-substitutable input in theatrical exhibition—the film itself—the 
distributors continued to exercise market power” over theatrical exhibition (Crandall, 1975: 62). 
Major filmed entertainment’s share of all films released in the United States is now declining to 
a level not seen since the late 1980s. However, unlike the 1980s, its share of all theatrical revenues 
might be approaching a historical high. Thus, in recent years, major filmed entertainment’s share of 
theatrical revenues is no longer dependent on whether it has a large share of all film releases in the 
United States. Instead, the stable popularity of superhero franchises and other blockbusters appears 
to have created a situation whereby major filmed entertainment is less concerned about the number 
of films that could potentially compete with mainstream Hollywood cinema. While few in number, 
the most popular blockbuster films lend their distributors a high degree of confidence about the 
social world of cinema.  
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The theatrical release window is closing 
In Figure 3, National Association of Theater Owners data is used to approximate the average size of 
Hollywood’s theatrical release window.  The series ‘Video Announcement’ is the average amount 
of days between opening day and the day when video release plans are announced—a signal that 
theatrical release is winding down, or even finished. The series ‘Video Release’ measures the entire 
period between opening day and the beginning of the video window (DVD, Blu-ray, previously 
VHS). 
This shortening of the theatrical release window is partly attributable to Internet piracy and 
bootlegging. By releasing its video formats at a quicker pace, major filmed entertainment is 
attempting to distribute each product before the associated wave of piracy reaches its crest. This 
shortening of the theatrical release window undermines the neo-classical explanation of risk in the 
Hollywood film business. Buried in this explanation is an assumption about the function of word-
of-mouth behavior. Such behavior is theorized to be an unpredictable, inherent risk; it can stop a 
“hit and run” strategy dead in its tracks (Cucco 2009: 223). For the first few weeks it may be 
possible for major filmed entertainment to attract audiences simply through promotion and 
advertising, even for its bad films. But after that, what De Vany calls an “uninformative information 
cascade” reaches it limit and seemingly random word-of-mouth communication makes the future 
success of a theatrical release extremely uncertain (De Vany, 2004: 124). 
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Figure 3. Average U.S. Theatrical Release Window for Major Studios, 1997-2013 
Note: Each series is an 8-quarter moving average of the data for Disney, Twentieth Century Fox, MGM, New Line, Paramount, 
Sony, Universal, and Warner Bros. 
Source: National Association of Theatre Owners (http://natoonline.org/data/windows/) 
 
This shortening of the theatrical release window cuts the word-of-mouth factor off at the knees. 
After a film has already been in theatres for a few weeks, and as the din of manufactured media 
buzz fades, there is only a small interval where word-of-mouth can put a film on a new, possibly 
unexpected, financial trajectory. As Cucco notes, this weakening of the word-of-mouth factor 
advantages a saturation booking strategy, which is the hallmark of blockbuster cinema: 
The expectation of [film] quality can be a risk as far as revenues are concerned, 
especially when speaking about blockbusters. This is why these films have been 
widely released on the opening weekend for almost 30 years now. By showing the 
film in many theatres at the same time, the number of people who watch a movie 
without reading reviews or hearing opinions beforehand increases (Cucco, 2009: 223). 
Just as importantly, the quickening of theatrical release disadvantages films that depend heavily 
on word-of-mouth. For example, let us examine the temporal difference between the theatrical 
releases of The Mummy Returns (Stephen Sommers, 2001) and O Brother, Where Art Thou? (Joel 
Coen, 2000). Both films were exhibited in the United States in 2001, a year when the average 
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interval between opening day and video announcement was 101 days. To earn 90 percent of its 
theatrical revenues The Mummy Returns only needed approximately 35 days, while O Brother 
needed approximately 112 days to accumulate 90 percent of a much smaller amount of theatrical 
revenues (they were almost five times smaller than the box-office gross revenues of The Mummy 
Returns) [12]. It should be recalled that O Brother was a very successful platform release – 
indicated by the face that much of its revenue was earned eleven days after the theatrical window 
was already closed for the average film. As a rule, major filmed entertainment tends not to nurture 
platform releases that, like Jim Jarmusch’s Dead Man (1995), might be artistically thought 
provoking but financially listless. Platform releases, whether successful or not, are overly dependent 
on word-of-mouth activity because business decisions have been made to not give these films a 
large advertising budget (Ulin, 2010: 384). If a platform release fails to generate some heat through 
word-of-mouth, major filmed entertainment prefers to let it languish in obscurity, rather than inject 
what is sometimes called “sustained marketing” (Ulin, 2010). 
Conceptualizing risk: The threat of aesthetic overproduction 
Because order is desirable for the capitalization of cinema, major filmed entertainment’s control of 
distribution is of major significance. This is not simply about the level of future earnings. If major 
filmed entertainment is unable to stand between the filmmaker and the consumer, an administered 
relationship between the aesthetic dimension of cinema and established social meaning cannot be 
established. Confident risk perceptions derive from major filmed entertainment’s ability to be the 
ultimate arbiter about the future of cinema. Although this power is not total, analyses of 
capitalization and risk demonstrate that an orderly, predictable world of cinema is of interest to 
major filmed entertainment. It seems, then, that the formulaic and repetitive tendencies of 
Hollywood may not be accidental; if they were, studios would simply need to attract more 
‘creative’ people. In actuality, the repetitive, even cautious, quality of Hollywood’s imagination 
indicates that the film business aims to keep creativity in the film industry within constructed limits.  
Let us now move from the order of cinema to the mechanism of strategic sabotage. Risk 
perceptions permeate the strategic sabotage of cinema because, all along the line, a calculation 
about the expected earnings of cinema must work with, and sometimes in spite of, another 
language: the language of art. More specifically, the Hollywood film business must determine how 
it will strategically sabotage the creativity of those who think cinema is primarily an art form. Such 
a characterization of social creativity is not meant to suggest that every artist or moviegoer 
participating in Hollywood cinema is critical of the creative limits imposed by business. Instead, the 
industrial art of filmmaking, with all of its aesthetic qualities, puts the Hollywood film business in a 
particular business-industry relationship which cannot be ignored. The detailed ways and means of 
a particular business-industry relationship, depend on the types of industry being controlled by 
business.  
The capacity for social creativity to go in different and unforeseen directions is always a 
potential threat to the aims of major filmed entertainment. Creativity is a wild animal which major 
filmed entertainment wants to harness in order to develop, finance, produce and distribute the 
‘right’ set of films. In this sense, both ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ refer not to aesthetic standards but to 
earnings. Fundamental to capitalist investment is confidence that, if needed, firms are able to steer 
social creativity in new directions without losing control.  
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A 2003 article in The Economist recognized that the control of creativity was cause for concern 
in the Hollywood film business. The business-industry struggle in Hollywood was characterized 
that between ‘suits’ (business) and ‘ponytails’ (industry):  
That the [film] industry tends over time to swing too far in favour of the ponytails, 
only to swerve back too far in favour of the suits, shows how hard it is to find a 
middle way. Devising a habitat in which creativity can flourish, yet within tight 
operational constraints: there lies a sequel for the entertainment industry worthy of a 
Hollywood blockbuster (Anon, 2003). 
Of course, there are historical examples of business dictating that creativity travel in one direction 
when it ‘should’ have, in hindsight, taken another path. For instance, the popularity of The Sound of 
Music (Robert Wise, 1965) was mistakenly taken as a sign that the major studios should produce 
more musicals at a time when the political values and cultural attitudes in America were radically 
changing. To be sure, Hollywood would eventually embrace the 1960s student, civil rights and anti-
Vietnam War movements with enthusiasm [13], but not before releasing a long string of unpopular 
musicals: Camelot (Joshua Logan, 1967), Doctor Dolittle (Richard Fleischer, 1967), Chitty Chitty 
Bang Bang (Ken Hughes, 1968), Hello, Dolly (Gene Kelly, 1969), Paint Your Wagon (Joshua 
Logan, 1969), Star! (Robert Wise, 1968), Sweet Charity (Bob Fosse, 1969) and Darling Lili (Blake 
Edwards, 1970). The financial failure of Darling Lili was particularly bitter: in an explicit attempt 
to re-exploit The Sound of Music, Darling Lili starred Julie Andrews, who plays a singing spy in 
World War I (Cook, 2000: 12). 
Decisions about the form and content of Hollywood films are haunted by the specter of 
‘aesthetic overproduction’. This term is my own tailoring of Veblen’s generic concept of 
“overproduction”. Overproduction, for Veblen, has a specific meaning; it applies “not to the 
material, mechanical bearing of the situation, but to its pecuniary bearing” (Veblen, 2006b: 215). 
Overproduction does not mean that the material and intellectual capacities of a workforce are 
overtaxed, nor does it mean that a community is physically or mentally unable to consume what is 
in supply. Overproduction is a “question of prices and earnings;” it refers to a level or type of 
production that is inexpedient purely on “pecuniary grounds.” Aesthetic overproduction is itself a 
consequence of the insight that accounts within modern business enterprise “are kept in terms of the 
money unit, not in terms of livelihood, nor in terms of the serviceability of the goods, nor in terms 
of the mechanical efficiency of the industrial or commercial plant.” Thus, regardless of the potential 
for cinema to be a domain for critical reason or political insight, film projects are “capitalized on the 
basis of their profit yielding capacity” (Veblen, 2006b: 85). 
The threat of aesthetic overproduction is visible when film production is embedded in the larger 
circuit of film production, distribution and exhibition. Indeed, the business interests of Hollywood 
might glimpse this threat well before a film is completed and then distributed. For instance, the 
brevity of Hollywood ‘pitch’ meetings, which determine whether a film project will even get funds 
for production, is a pre-distribution barrier to any film project that cannot be sold in the high 
concept style (Elsbach and Kramer, 2003; Wyatt, 1994). Moreover, the conflicts between business 
and art in pitch meetings, or even during principal photography, can point to the potential 
uncertainties of film distribution. Conversely, the financial failures of distribution can go back 
upstream to implicate those readying new film projects. The infamous failure of Waterworld (Kevin 
Reynolds, 1995), for instance, serves as a sober warning for those who think a new project has all 
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the ‘right’ elements for high grosses - e.g. big movie star, lots of action, expensive and elaborate 
sets. 
The specter of aesthetic overproduction means that major filmed entertainment has a real 
incentive to sustain a form of cinema that is repetitive, formulaic and conservative. Even if there is 
a technological/anthropological capacity for the art of filmmaking to go well beyond the ‘limits’ 
that are imposed in Hollywood cinema, guideposts like the star system and film genre help keep 
everybody within the well-beaten path. The purpose is not to suffocate all forms of artistic 
innovation. Rather, genre and the star system ‘save’ filmmakers the trouble of yearning for, and 
then abandoning, unconventional filmmaking techniques that could jeopardize distribution with any 
of Hollywood’s dominant firms (Rosenbaum, 2000).   
Moreover, the repetitive nature of consumer behaviour is about more than ideology. Confidence 
about the size and pattern of expected earnings is likely to increase if moviegoers have a 
predilection for only a narrow range of film types. The threat of aesthetic overproduction is a strong 
reason why there is, within the Hollywood business, a vested interest to ‘pre-sell’ its films, to 
habituate moviegoers to want new films to have a familiar, pre-digested quality (Maltby, 2003). It 
might also explain why independent filmmakers seem to take an oppositional stance against the 
sensibilities of the average audience. For an independent filmmaker to claim they make films “for 
only themselves” or “for nobody” could very well be symbolic resistance to all that is implied when 
Hollywood says it makes films to “please an audience” (Ortner, 2013: 1–53). 
Conclusion: What makes Hollywood run? 
This article was born from a curiosity about how the art of filmmaking within the social relations of 
capitalism minimizes financial risks in the pursuit of profit. This curiosity is informed by certain 
conceptual tools that can be employed to critique the political economy of Hollywood. Here, the 
capital-as-power approach can deepen what is obvious to many: the business of culture does not 
exhaust the potentials of human creativity because capitalist investment is not embracing human 
creativity for its own sake. Rather, the interest of profit can be so strong that it repressively dictates 
the terms of creativity in capitalism. When the scope and potential of creativity is too open-ended, 
such a cultural environment is accounted as risk (the degree of confidence in making predictions 
about future earnings). What this open-endedness might mean for the cultural and political value of 
art is another story.  
My observations are only starting points for a more substantial political economy of Hollywood. 
It is now evident why the Hollywood film business would want to create and reinforce deterministic 
social relations in the world of cinema. Ordering these social relations is a defense against the threat 
of aesthetic overproduction. This threat, which again is financial, appears when the future social 
significance and aesthetics of cinema is uncertain. Such uncertainty derives from social-historical 
shifts in meaning, desire and, more generally, cultural norms and values. Shifts in the social 
meaning of cinema do not undermine filmmaking or film watching as cultural or political activities. 
But they can undermine business interests that capitalize and sabotage cinema on the assumption 
that film production, distribution and exhibition are, primarily, capitalist techniques. The capitalist 
control of cinema as a process of technique falls apart if the relationship between cinema and an 
already instituted social imaginary is obscure to the point of being non-determinable. 
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Endnotes 
[1] For various theorizations, applications and critiques of the capital-as-power 
approach,visit http://bnarchives.yorku.ca/ and http://www.capitalaspower.com/   
[2] These examples concerning the aspects of Star Wars are protected by 
copyright were found in the United States Copyright Public Records 
(http://cocatalog.loc.gov/). 
[3] It is not a typographical error that Luke Skywalker is listed as “Luke 
Starfiller.” Some of the Star Wars copyrights were registered as early as 1974 
(Star Wars Corporation & Lucasfilm Ltd, 1974). 
[4]  For a concise anthropology of capitalization, see (Nitzan and Bichler, 
2009:147–166). 
[5]  Pokorny and Sedgwick argue that the predilections of an average moviegoer 
will only last so long, which is why film producers cannot use these 
predilections as guidelines for future film production. On its own, this 
argument is perfectly reasonable. However, the problem is that their other 
arguments imply that the habits and desires of film consumers are unstable 
from film to film: “… any film production strategy based on the success of 
single, one-off film projects is doomed to failure. Rather, a more sensible 
strategy for a rational profit-maximizing film producer is to produce a wide 
range of films annually, in the hope that at least some of these will produce 
profits that will compensate for the losses that a large proportion of these films 
will inevitably generate. That is, we could characterize the successful film 
studios/distributors as constructing diversified annual portfolios of films, 
diversified according to production budget and genre, and allocation of stars, 
directors and screenwriters. The issue, then, is not so much which of the films 
in the portfolio are profitable, but simply that the portfolio itself is profitable” 
(Pokorny and Sedgwick, 2012: 188–190). 
[6]  For an expanded version of this explanation, see (McMahon, 2013). 
[7]  While he was not using the same terms, we can find the germ of this idea in 
Spinoza’s Theological-Political Treatise: “A person’s judgment, admittedly, 
may be subjected to another’s in many different and sometimes almost 
unbelievable ways to such an extent that, even though he may not be directly 
under the other person’s command, he may be so dependent on him that he 
may properly be said to be under his authority to that extent. Yet, however 
much skillful methods may accomplish in this respect, these have never 
succeeded in altogether suppressing men’s awareness that they have a good 
deal of sense of their own and that their minds differ no less than do their 
palates” (Spinoza, 2007, chap.20, §2). 
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[8]  According to Jonathan Rosenbaum, film journalism helps perpetuate the idea 
that a movie’s quality is signified in its financial success. Of concern is a 
recent trend whereby two film business terms –‘turkeys’ (bad movies) and 
‘bombs’ (financial disasters)—are conflated in film journalism. This conflation 
perpetuates a sort of shorthand for the general audience, where a film must be 
a turkey because financial data in Hollywood tell us it was a bomb 
(Rosenbaum, 1997). 
[9]  For a selection of important film library transfers between 1957 and 2010, see 
(Vogel, 2011: 104–105). 
[10]  In a partnership with Western Electric, Warner Brothers was developing a 
“sound-on-a-disc” system in 1926. The Fox Film Corporation, which was to 
merge with Twentieth Century Pictures in the 1935, was the first to develop a 
means of putting sound on film stock (Hanssen, 2005: 90). 
[11]  As Kristin Thompson notes, “In early 1928, Louis B. Mayer declared that he 
was not worried [about the language problem]; he assumed that the popularity 
of American films would lead to the use of English as a universal language” 
(Thompson 1985: 158). 
[12]  Data for these two examples, The Mummy Returns and O Brother, Where Art 
Thou?, are taken from (Maltby, 2003: 202, 204). 
[13]  For a thorough and stimulating examination of the decade when Hollywood 
embraced New Wave Cinema and the political ideals that inspired it, see 
(Kirshner, 2012). 
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